CAN LAW HALT THE VIOLENCE? PALESTINIAN
SUICIDE BOMBINGS AND ISRAELI "TARGETED
ASSASINATIONS" UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
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I. INTRODUCTION

My objective in this paper is not to use international law as another weapon
in the conflict, as further fuel to fan the flames, as it's so often used in this
conflict, but instead to use it as a message to both Palestinians and Israelis:
Stop. Enough. A plague on both your houses. The point is to get the parties
back to negotiating a peace agreement by using international law to demonstrate
that each side's brutality through armed action only engenders a reciprocal
armed brutality by the other in a classic cycle of violence.
This approach is prompted by three developments:
1)

*

First, the utter insanity of the current impasse, the mutually
destructive behavior in which close to 4000 people have been
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killed in the four years since the second Intifada began-over
2800 Palestinians and over 900 Israelis - with no end in sight.'
Indeed, in the last two weeks [not counting the Taba bombings,
which may have been by Egyptian militants and not Hamas],
another 100 have died, including perhaps 30 children, primarily
Palestinian. The two sides are incapable of breaking the cycle
themselves, in part because they won't let the other side have
the last shot, literally;
Second, the International Court of Justice's July 2004 advisory
opinion about the Separation Wall,2 particularly, the hysterical
Israeli rejection of it. Because Israel did not concede jurisdiction and the opinion, in their view, ignored the murder of Israeli
citizens in repeated terrorist attacks, it has been perceived there
as just another piece of one-sided, politicized anti-Zionist
propaganda from the UN. Therefore, in my estimation, the best
way to attain Israeli compliance with international law is to
demonstrate the culpability of both parties to the conflict and to
seek the accountability of both sides for violating international
law;
Finally, the third development is the recent UN "Focus 2004"
Summit drawing attention to treaties on the protection of
civilians, who are the primary victims in armed conflicts all
over the world today. The distinction between combatants, who
take a direct part in armed hostilities, and non-combatants is one
of "the oldest, most fundamental maxims of established
customary rules of humanitarian law."3

I'm now going to lay out how both suicide bombings and targeted
assassinations are war crimes and possibly also crimes against humanity. But
my point is not so much to press for prosecution of those individually
responsible. I'm more concerned about state responsibility on Israel's part and
the question of whether there's some kind of quasi-state responsibility on the
part of the Palestinian Authority for failure to exercise effective control over
terrorists operating from Palestinian-controlled territory.
Given that it's always easy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to accuse the
other side of fabricating facts and given that very few independent monitors of
the "facts on the ground" are deemed to be unbiased, I'm going to use a
paradigmatic series of attacks instead of actual incidents to illustrate this
1.

IntifadaDeath Toll, BBC NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004.

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
2.
I.C.J., 43 I.L.M. 1009 (July 9, 2004).
3.

Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
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analysis. Imagine (and it isn't difficult to do, as it has happened so often) that
a 16-year old Palestinian suicide bomber walks into a shopping mall north of
Tel Aviv and kills 17 Israeli shoppers. Approximately two weeks later, Israeli
army helicopters fire a missile at a structure within a refugee camp in the West
Bank where the dispatcher of the suicide bomber is working. He is killed along
with his wife and children, as well as 23 neighbors in surrounding homes.
Shortly after that, a nephew of the bomb dispatcher decides to become a suicide
bomber in memory of his uncle.
Trying to determine "who started it" in order to assign relative fault is not
a particularly effective mediation technique in the middle of a cycle of violence
because the determination is unlikely to be accepted by both sides-which will
then result in further retaliatory attacks.
II. THRESHOLD QUESTION: IS IT INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT?
First, a threshold question: Does international humanitarian law apply to
the waves of violence between Israel and the Palestinians? If the Intifada is
"armed conflict," it is undisputed to be international rather than internal armed
conflict. Not only the ICJ but also the Supreme Court of Israel on numerous
occasions have applied provisions of the 4th Geneva Convention to the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.
But does the cycle of Intifada violence-terrorist attacks (whether in the
name of national liberation or for purely nihilistic reasons) and targeted killings
(whether defended as retaliatory for past attacks or deterrent of future ones) constitute armed conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law?
The ICTY in the Tadic case defined armed conflict as including "protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups.
[Therefore,] [i]nternational humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such
armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until ...
a peaceful
4
settlement is achieved." The Geneva Conventions apply even when one side
is not a Contracting Party. Moreover, the fighting can be sporadic and still be
considered armed conflict.
Of course, International Criminal Law holds the perpetrators and their
commanders and instigators individually responsible. But as I said, I'm more
interested in focusing on the corporate responsibility, so-to-speak. I'll discuss
shortly the issue of whether there is a command structure within the Palestinian
Authority sufficient to hold it accountable for implementing humanitarian law
in the territory it controls, which would include locations that Hamas operates
from. As for Israel's defense that what it is doing constitutes counter-terrorism

4.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-1-AR72, 70, 35 I.L.M. 32, 54 (October 2)
(decision on the defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction).
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and not war, then it would be required to prove guilt before a court of law
instead of assassinating the targets in their cars, homes or mosques.
III. SUICIDE BOMBINGS AS WAR CRIMES

Using the Rome Statute's article 8 delineation of international crimes as a
codification of customary law, war crimes include willful killing or causing
great suffering to non-combatants (which is a grave breach of the 4th Geneva
Convention), directing an attack against civilians not taking part in hostilities,
and causing excessive incidental death, injury or damage to civilians. All three
types of war crimes require knowledge or intent to subject civilians to attack.
Hamas has frequently claimed that Israeli settlers are not civilians and
sometimes claims that Israelis living within the Green Line are not either. But
under Geneva Protocol I, a civilian is someone who is not a member of an
organized armed force and is not taking part in hostilities, which means
someone in the very act of posing an imminent threat to life.6 While it may be
disputable whether that would cover an attack on Israeli soldiers standing at a
bus stop while on weekend leave, it surely covers bombs which kill or maim
shoppers in a shopping mall.
IV. TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS AS WAR CRIMES

A. Application of the Same Criteria
The same war crimes as just described would apply to Israeli actions.
More particularly, in regard to the direct targets of assassinations, whom Israel
considers to be combatants, Common Art 3 (a baseline ofjus cogens applying
to any armed conflict) prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable to civilized peoples." Regarding civilians who are killed in the wake of a
targeted assassination, it is a war crime to employ a method of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, including attacks "which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians" and
"which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." 7 Thus, "military necessity" arguments which are made
by Israel are subject to a rule of proportionality.

5.
Multilateral Protection of War Victims, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1147, 6 U.S.T 3516 [hereinafter
Multilateral Protection]; Fourth Geneva Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 28, 75 U.N.T.S 287.
6.

Geneva Protocol 1, June 8, 1977, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S. 26.

7.

Id, art., 51 para. (5)(b).
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B. Is There a Counter-obligationNot to Locate Military Targets amid
Civilians?
While it's usually a matter of heated factual dispute as to whether
Palestinian militants deliberately place themselves and their associated military
equipment in the middle of civilian areas, so as to make the surrounding
civilians vulnerable to indiscriminate Israeli weaponry, I will note that the 4th
Geneva Convention provides that "the presence of a protected person may not
be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations."8
Using civilians as "human shields" is prohibited. But it should also be pointed
out that killing militants when they are not taking part in hostilities or posing an
imminent threat to lives-for instance, when driving a car or exiting a mosque
-is also prohibited. Taking part in hostilities only causes a temporary loss of
protection.
V. ARE EITHER SUICIDE BOMBINGS OR TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS ALSO
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY?

I will leave this issue to those of you who are more predisposed to a
shouting match over facts on the ground and will simply lay out the criteria for
what constitutes a crime against humanity: Particularly serious-in fact, odious
-attacks on human dignity; systematic or widespread attacks (not isolated
events); a civilian population that is specifically targeted and knowledge that the
offenses are part of a systematic or widespread attack against a civilian population.
A crime against humanity-in contrast to a war crime-need not be
committed during armed conflict. So even if the Intifada is determined not to
be an "armed conflict," this part of International Humanitarian Law still applies.
According to leading authority Antonio Cassese, crimes are considered systematic or widespread when there is "the manifestation of a policy or plan drawn
up by or inspired by State authorities or by the leading officials of a de facto
state-like organization, or of an organized political group."9
VI. PARITY? Do THE PALESTINIANS HAVE INT'L RESPONSIBILITY?

To begin to wrap-up, I return to my initial motivation for engaging in this
analysis: that demonstrating the culpability of both sides (without attempting
to quantify or assign relative fault) might allow each of them to move beyond
the impulse to retaliate yet again and instead, to agree to cooperate to halt the
cycle of brutality for which they both bear responsibility. There's an irony in
8.

Multilateral Protection, supra note 6, art. 28.

9.

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 64

(2003).

362

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 11:357

this: in the political realm, the asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians
goes the other way: Israel is more powerful because it is a state. But in the
legal realm, there is an asymmetry if the Palestinians are not held to account
under the same rules of armed conflict that apply to Israel.
Three related questions must be asked. Legally, does a national liberation
movement such as the Palestinian Authority, seeking to become a state, have the
duty to implement the rules of international humanitarian law within the
territory it has jurisdiction over? Factually, is there effective control by the PA
over Hamas and other sponsors of suicide bombings? Politically, should Israel
share some responsibility for undermining the authority of the PA to such an
extent that it cannot control the terrorists who operate from its territory?
VII. IMPLICATIONS

A. ForInternationalLaw
Briefly, there are two important implications for international law
generally. First, especially since September 11, there is a growing awareness
of the need to hold non-state actors directly responsible under international
humanitarian law and human rights law. Provisions of the ILCs Draft Articles
on State Responsibility which deal with non-official actors under the control of
a state or with successful insurrectional movements which later become a state
do not address the question of the current responsibility of a non-state which
wants to be a state.
Second is the lack of an objective adjudicator for conflicts like this one
while it is ongoing. It is unfortunately a truism that not only is international law
on the protection of civilians rarely enforced; it's also true that it is even more
rarely enforced in the Middle East. There is no regional human rights court and
while the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court could, on his own
initiative,'0 undertake an investigation of criminal violations during the second
Intifada, he is unlikely to take on such a politicized case so early on in the
institution's history. And the ICC would not be adjudicating state responsibility.
B. For the Arab-israeliConflict
There are many implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict. But a significant
one that this analysis discloses is that statehood for the Palestinians is the
obvious answer to halting the violence because statehood will give them the
means as well as the incentive, both legally and politically, to stop terrorists

10.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 15, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 100.
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before they attack Israel and thereby jeopardize the Palestinian state itself.
What is required for statehood is of course another topic for another day and so
I'll end there.

